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"Everybody's Talking": The Future of
Comparative Law
By P.G. MONATERI*
I. Introduction: Family Trees and Wandering Jews
The main objective of this paper is to discuss the future of com-
parative law, and I will discuss two main departments of the disci-
pline: the culture/difference sector and the importlexport store. My
view is that the first department works for projects of governance,
whereas the second is more appropriate for critique.
The first department is, indeed, supposed to provide the para-
digm for taxonomy within the professional community of compara-
tive law. I call the prevailing paradigm the "Family Tree Theory,"
which views legal cultures as more or less stable, rooted families ca-
pable of being represented by genealogical trees. I maintain that this
approach has been extremely efficient in establishing a picture of the
Western legal tradition as a whole, in particular serving global cul-
tural projects of governance.
The second department, by contrast, focuses more on legal
transplants and borrowings. Thus, it is rather fit to describe this the-
ory of legal institutions as the "Wandering Jews," scuttling across the
boundaries of different cultures. From this viewpoint legal systems
are seen not as coherent units, but rather as having been "contami-
nated" by scattered traits. Although this model has been sponsored
* Professor of Law, University of Turin, Law School (Torino, Italy); Interna-
tional Faculty of Comparative Law (Strasbourg, France); Associate Member, Inter-
national Academy of Comparative Law (Paris and New York). The collective proc-
ess that gave rise to my paper has been widespread. Anyway, I can single out two
meetings which have been pretty formative for the conceptions that unfold in this
work: the conference on "New Approaches to Comparative Law" held at the Uni-
versity of Utah, School of Law (October 1996) and the conference on "Private Law
Theory" sponsored by the Graduate Program and European Law Research Center,
Harvard Law School (March 9-10, 1997). I wish to thank all participants. Miscon-
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by some of the sacred cows of the profession, it is still at the margin,
and as a result it is often misunderstood. My proposal is that this ap-
proach is particularly well suited for critical studies and should be
used for ideological criticism in particular.
The recurrent themes in my argument will be how legal families
are defined, how systems are grouped together, how borrowings are
possible, why they happen, how it is that others are represented and
who are these others.
As a result of these two departments, I divide my paper into two
parts. The former reviews how comparativism can be linked with
projects of cultural self-consciousness, and I use the "Birth of Com-
parativism" and German Ijistoricism as a main example of how com-
parative law can be used to unravel a consciousness. In the latter
part, I try to outline which kind of critique can be purported by a dif-
ferent kind of comparativism, giving a new reading to Alan Watson's
theory of legal transplants and Sacco's theory of legal formants. My
conclusion will be in favor of a picture of comparative law mainly as
ideological criticism, in essence a critique of the way lawyers produce
meanings as a key factor in the working of a legal culture.
H. Comparative Law as Governance
A. Culture and Difference
I start my argument with a picture of comparative law as an at-
tempt to mediate between a "field" and an "audience," coping with
the problem of self-definition of one culture within the legal world.
It is patent to me that we can speak of import/export only after we
define where the boundaries are, which means that we have stated
principles of inclusion and of exclusion, of similarities and differ-
ences.1 Culture (and the differences between them) has always been
a central concern of comparative law, and the first step of the conven-
tional approach is to divide the legal world into legal families by
tracing back common roots, as genealogies to explain the present.
Genealogies define who we think we are or would like to think we
are. They define an "us" and a "them," and they are an essential
mechanism of how identities are constructed. The "tracing back of
common roots" is a work of representation, which occupies a central
1. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism
and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545.
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place in current studies on culture, especially in the practice of ex-
hibiting cultures as "others." In these exercises in mapping cultures,
systems of law are joined or distinguished according to a theory of
what their basic units or structures are, and according to the respec-
tive weights assigned to different elements. Thus, defining identities
depends heavily on the framework assumed for mapping.
A second point of major concern for comparative law has always
been the transplants and borrowings of legal models across various
systems and families. In recent literature we see a renewal of interest
in comparative law aimed at the introduction of newer terms to de-
scribe its aims and methods.2 Of course, a main subject today consists
of the conscious projects to export "Western" legal models into for-
mer socialist countries, to design their institutions, and in the actual
drafting of model laws, particularly in the field of corporations.3
What is amazing is that schemes to create governance through export
of legal patterns are carried on notwithstanding the lack of a com-
monly accepted theory of legal "identities" and legal transplants.
From this standpoint I think that both the "definition of identi-
ties" as well as the "import/export" can be seen as interested, non-
neutral, purposive projects of governance. Now, if we adopt this
strategy of analysis to cope with "comparative law" as a discipline, we
can see how much it has been an attempt to meet different audiences
and their expectations. Which is to say that comparative law is not
normally "transnational" at all, but rather it grows within the frame-
works of different legal traditions, responding to inner needs of legal
elites. From this point of view, a first unexpected aim that can be
pursued by comparativism is "insulation." This strategy has been
pursued in Britain where the distinction between a common law and
a civil law has been used to "create" and defend a national identity in
the field of the law.' But the same "insulation" aim has been used by
2. See id.; William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it like to
Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995) [hereinafter Comparative Jurisprudence
(I)]; William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (11): The Logic of Legal Trans-
plants, 43 AM. J. CoMp. L. 489 (1995) [hereinafter Comparative Jurisprudence (11)];
Mitchell Lasser, Judicial (Self) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the Frendi Legal Sys-
tem, 104 YALE LJ. 1325 (1995). These sources strongly challenge conventional com-
parative law scholarship and display discomfort toward the settled circles of profes-
sional comparativists.
3. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corpo-
rate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996).
4. See W.W HowE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LA\V AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 109 (F.B. Rothman 1980) (1896).
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socialist lawyers to maintain an imagined separation of socialist coun-
tries from the rest of the world A goal also promoted by "Western"
specialists with a strong professional interest in defining the peculiar
subject of Soviet studies as one discipline within the Western aca-
demic world. This strategy of marking differences with "aliens,"
while borrowing ideas from them, was adopted by French scholars,
Raymond Saleilles in particular. In his French presentation of the
German Civil Code, Biirgerliches Gesetz Buch, he labeled the Ger-
mans as different and "philosophical," a kind of insult among law-
yers. At the same time, he was importing ideas from them. We can
define this strategy as a form of "etherization" of the other, and its
possible impact may be a way of assimilating while denying that any-
thing was borrowed.
At the opposite of insulation lies the strategy of comparative
law for unification. It is quite apparent that comparative law has
been based, to a large extent, on the search for a "common core" and
has been used to deny differences among various European traditions
to define a new identity with practical implications. The definition of
a common European legal identity is patently directed toward the
massive cross-board import/export of patterns to create a new law.
Thus, once again the two departments of comparative law work to-
gether to show one possible use of comparativism. In this process the
boundaries among systems are drawn between laws of "Western"
countries and non-Western laws, in the form of the exoticization of
African or Asian laws,' and in maintaining an area of common post-
socialist systems as a major area of export for Western patterns. In
both cases the "foreign," non-Western systems are made ready to re-
ceive Western models as necessary for development in a clear, con-
ventional, evolutive paradigm, through inspiration of values such as
"democracy," the "rule of law" and the "free market."
It is quite interesting from a comparative point of view that this
great effort of the import department is intensively blurring the dis-
5. See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia
and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 94 (1995).
6. See RAYMOND SALEILLES, ETUDE SUR LA THIORIE GINERALE, DE
L'OBLIGATION D'APRkS LE PREMIER PROJET DE CODE CIVIL ALLEMAND [STUDY OF
THE GENERAL THEORY OF CONTRACTS ACCORDING TO THE FIRST CIVIL CODE
PROJECT OF GERMANY] (1890).
7. I make special reference to the conception of abus de droit [abuse of a right],
which, after Saleilles, became a major topic of French doctrine.
8. See Kennedy, supra note 1.
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tinctions, so often cultivated in the past, among American and Euro-
pean systems. The difference between the French or the German
model are quite forgotten, and even the sharper distinction between a
common and civil law world are softened, emphasizing common eco-
nomic and political structures, and setting aside the legal technicali-
ties by which such common structures operate in the different institu-
tional settings of the "Western" legal world.
I maintain the importance of "purposive" non-neutral character
of comparative law, especially in its more neutral pretensions, such as
the projects of "mapping" the world in legal systems and families.
Such "mappings," which are by definition crucial to a theory of
transplants, are but efforts in defining identities and in coping with
"others."
B. The "Birth of Comparativism"
In this section, I outline some of the uses of comparative law to
define national identity, using as an example the same birth of com-
parative studies in Germany.
This part of the work is a history of historical consciousness in
the field of law, an inquiry into the cultural function of historical
thinking, casting serious doubt over the value of history in the field of
legal comparison as either a rigorous science or a genuine art.9 The
same idea of "legal evolution" has a history of its own, and its strate-
gic character is sometimes openly credited, even in traditional litera-
ture.
10
Ideas do not come together by themselves. They are assembled
by real people with actual needs and strategies. If we look for the
package of ideas lying at the basis of the Western self-consciousness
in law, we must take note of the sudden emergence of German legal
historicism at the beginning of the last century." This is necessary in
order to see how it was based on a peculiarly insulated conception of
Roman law, and how this conception came to be mingled with com-
9. See Louis 0. Mink, Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding, 21
REV. METAPHYsIcS 667 (1968).
10. PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA ix (1980); see also
E. Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurispnidence, 85 COLUM. L REV.
38 (1985) (discussing various approaches to legal evolution).
11. In the context of what Ewald has called comparative jurisprudence. For the
impact of German legal historicism on America, see THE REcEPTION OF
CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAWv WORLD 1820-1920 (Mathias Reimann
ed., 1993).
1998]
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parativism to produce an "Aryan model" of the Western legal tradi-
tion. By "Aryan model" I mean a theory of the strong cross-cultural
links among different peoples traceable back to a past common Indo-
European period, producing a framework of similarities of their vari-
ous institutions.
Legal historicism was the theory adopted by the most influential
German scholar of the time, Carl Frederich von Savigny," "[t]he
greatest jurist that Europe has produced." 3 His form of historicism
was intended to replace a universalistic theory of natural law as a ba-
sis for a rational purposive discourse on the law; a paradigm which
dominated the legal debate during the eighteenth century period of
the Enlightenment. 4 Law, he maintained, is deeply rooted in local
traditions; it is an expression of the deepest beliefs of a people, in-
separable from their manners and morals, their customs, and history;
there is an organic link between law and the essence of a nation."
For him and his followers the "cult" of Roman law had to supersede
a universalistic rational conception of the law.16 Roman law became
the alternative to the Law of Reason, and it was an alternative em-
bodied within the German legal history. Of course to be a valid al-
ternative Roman law had to be extraordinary.
Without plunging into details lying outside of the scope of the
present essay, I would stress Savigny's conception of the function of
Roman law as a common law for Europe and for Germany in par-
ticular." Of course he had a strategy, and it was to start a process of
elaboration of a national German law, which indeed started and
ended in 1900 with the codification of a common private law for all of
Germany. He needed a ground to build upon, and the mass of Ro-
12. On Savigny, see Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 2, at 2012;
see also Symposium, Savigny in Modem Comparative Perspective, 37 AM. J. COMP. L.
1 (1989). On the history of German legal thought in the early nineteenth century,
see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC
ERA (1990).
13. Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 L.Q.
REV. 326, 326-27 (1973) (quoting Sir John Macdonnell).
14. See O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 242 (2d ed. 1994).
15. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence(I), supra note 2, at 2016. In the Middle
Ages, the German Empire adopted Roman law as the general law of the land, and it
became the root of the German unfolding of a proper national law. In this sense, the
Germans succeeded the Romans. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 188.
16. See GABOR HAMZA, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ANTIQUITY 34-35 (Jbzsef
Szabb trans., 1991).
17. See Franz Wieacker, Friederich Carl von Savigny, 1995 ZEITSCHRIFr DER
SAVIGNY-STIFrUNG FUR RECHTGESCHICHTE 85.
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man legal texts gave him the blocks for his "scientific" construction
of a newer law.
The overall stress on the importance of Roman law led Savigny
to a conception of Roman law as something more than just positive
law; it also implied a given intellectual history 8 that was somewhat
peculiar. In order to build a new German law on its basis, Roman
law was studied as a complete, autonomous system that could be
elaborated and developed into a modem legal system according to
scientific principles. This approach produced an "ideology" of Ro-
man uniqueness that entails an almost total exclusion of the impor-
tance of any other law.19 What is most relevant is that this ideology of
uniqueness is suggested by comparative legal studies. I mean that
comparativism was first used not to bypass a national view of the law,
but rather to create and support it.
It was Eduard Gans2° in particular who conceived his work on
the law of inheritance2' in the spirit of universalrechtgeschichte (uni-
versal legal history). He considered Indian, Chinese, Hebrew, Is-
lamic, Scandinavian, Icelandic, Scottish, Portuguese, Attic and Ro-
man law, among others in his studies. The introduction to his
massive work is a piece of great interest since it is based on attaining
coherence. He remarks that no exclusive importance should be given
to any one law at the expense of any other legal system, but then he
comments on the special importance of Roman law because of the
large role it played in the overall history of the lam.' It is quite re-
markable that the introduction to a work covering all the world is en-
titled "Roman History and Roman Law."
How is it that this logic of exclusion came to be mingled with
18. HAMZA, supra note 16, at 35.
19. A typical exclusion was the complete denial of any possible relevance of He-
brew law, notwithstanding that a large amount of German population was of Jewish
origin. While Roman law could hardly be described as the product of the German
spirit (Volksgeist), it has been a "miracle" of German legal historicism to deny any
non-Roman influence on the development of a German national law.
20. Eduard Gans is reputed the founder of German comparative law. See
Mitchell Franklin, The Influence of Savigny and Gans on the Development of the Le-
gal and Constitutional Theory of Christian Roselius, in FEmscHRIFr FOR ERNST
RABEL 145 (1954).
21. See EDUARD GANS, DAS ERBRECHT IN WELTGESCHICHTLICHER
ENTWICKLUNG: EINE ABHANDLUNG DER UNIVERSALRECHTSGESCHICHTE [THE LAW
OF INHERITANCE IN A WORLD HISTORY PERSPECTIVE: A TREATISE ON UNIVERSAL
LEGAL HISTORY] (Scientia Verlag 1963) (1824-1835).
22. Id. atxxiii.
23. Id. at xxv.
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comparativism? Indeed many of the Savigny's admitted followers,
such as Anselm Feuerbach, Karl Theodor Puetter, Eduard Gans and
Friederich W. Unger, were of the opinion that comparative studies
were as important in law4 as they were in linguistics." It was a com-
parativism associated with the strategy of reconstructing the original
common Aryan background of Western civilizations.
In 1829, this comparative trend gave birth to the Kritische
Zeitschrift fur Rechtwissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes
(Critical Review of Comparative Legal Studies) as the first world
journal on comparative law, which published twenty-six volumes until
1853. From a philosophical standpoint, the ideological foundation of
comparative law in connection with race can be easily traced back to
Hegel's theory of a close link between institutions and race,'6 and so
between Roman institutions and their Indo-European background.
This "Aryan" approach to comparison relied, to a large extent, on the
findings of comparative linguistics. The works of Franz Bopp and Ja-





This survey does not intend to criticize the scholarship embodied
in those works. Certainly the authors engaged in building up the
"Aryan theory" were prominent scholars with solid reputations. 2  I
only want to stress the link between issues of race29 and the style of
24. HAMZA, supra note 16, at 43.
25. On the relevance of Linguistics and of Herder on the German legal thought,
see Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 2. From a more general cul-
tural point of view, see also Robert E. Norton, The Tyranny of Germany over
Greece?, in BLACK ATHENA REVISITED 403 (Mary R. Lefkowitz & Guy MacLean
Rogers eds., 1996).
26. On Hegel's love for Europe and India and his total despise of Africa, see
G.W.F. HEGEL, LECrURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY 154-209 (H.B.
Nisbet trans. & ed., 1975). The original work was published by his disciples after his
death in 1831. On the relations between Hegel and Gans, see HAMZA, supra note
16, at 39.
27. 1 A.F. SCHNITZER, VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSLEHERE [COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES] 13 (2d ed. 1961).
28. We may sometimes question such reputations on the basis of modern stan-
dards. In 1847, Oppert, a German expert in cuneiform texts, published a book on
Indian Criminal Law, describing commonalities with Roman Law even though India
had nothing to do with cuneiform writing. For a comment on his work, see J.
GILSON, L'ETUDE DU DROIT ROMAIN COMPARE AUX AUTRES DROITS DE
L'ANTIQUITE [ROMAN LAW COMPARED WITH OTHER ANCIENT LAWS] 28 (1899).
29. That the Indo-Europeans were intended to be one racial group is out of the
question, and this is the point I am interested in here, whereas the skin color of an-
cient peoples is immaterial. See Frank M. Snowden Jr., Bernal's "Blacks" and the
Afrocentricists, in BLACK ATHENA REVISITED, supra note 25, at 112. Ironically, the
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legal studies in nineteenth-century Germany where the "Aryan the-
ory" developed, evolving into studies on ancient German law.
For instance, in August Rossbach's work on marriage,' we find a
comparative appraisal of Roman, Indian, Greek and German law
which was a full realization of the Aryan approach. His theory was
that the foundation of this part of the law was basically the same
within the entire Indo-Germanic family. While it is beyond the scope
of this work to criticize such achievements of German scholarship, it
is worthwhile to note that Rossbach's findings were inspired by the
theory itself; they were not the results of independent tests of the
theory. His main argument was that, notwithstanding the total lack
of empirical evidence, analogies between different Aryan laws were
evident because of the close bonds and common kinship these peo-
ples shared."
These late nineteenth-century studies were directed towards dif-
ferent efforts of reconstruction of the "original Aryan law" (Ur-
recht)' with a strong accent on the Aryan ethnic community. They
adopted the methods of comparative linguistics but reconstructed the
pattern of the original law on the basis of the Roman categories.
Roman law was "the template" toward which the original law
evolved.
Even such an outstanding scholar as Rudolf von Jhering fol-
lowed the trend in a work of comparative history on Indo-
Europeans.3 He clearly identified the law (in general) with Roman
law, ' and he traced it and its perfection back to Aryan roots. For
Jhering, Roman law assumed a crucial importance even in the field of
comparative law grounded on ethnic terms."' The Aryan theory be-
logic of exclusion can be as strong as "color blind."
30. AUGUST ROSSBACH, UNTERSUCHUNGEN UBER DIE ROEMISCHE EHE
[iNVESTIGATION OF ROMAN MARRIAGE] (1853).
31. Id. at 37,192,198; see also HAMZA, supra note 16, at 44 (similar remarks).
32. B.W. LEIsT, ALT-ARIsCHES Ius GENTIUM [ANCIENT ARYAN Jus GE\NTIuM]
(1889); B.W. LEIST, ALT-ARISCHES IUS CIVILE [ANCIENTARYAN JUS CIVILE] (1892).
33. RUDOLF VON JHERING, VORGESCHICHTE DER INDOEUROPAER [THE EARLY
HISTORY OF INDOEUROPEANS] (Victor Ehrenberg ed., 1884). This was von Jhering's
last book and was edited by Ehrenberg after his death.
34. W. Wilhelm, Das Recht imn roemischen Recht [Justice in Roman Law], in
JHERINGS ERBE. GOTrINGER SYMPOSION ZUR 150. WIEDERKEHR DES GEBURTSTAGS
VON RUDOLPH VON JHERING [GOTTINGER SYMPOSIUM FOR THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY
FOR THE BIRTH OF RUDOLPH VON JHERING] 228 (Franz Wieacker & Christian Woll-
schliger eds., 1970).
35. See 3 W. FIKENTCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER
DARSTELLUNG [COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES] 250 (1976).
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came the key to understanding Roman law supremacy and unique-
ness in comparison to non-Aryan laws.
It is important to note that the Aryan theory survived in our cen-
tury. Garabed Amaduni, a specialist on Armenian law, described a
parallel between Roman and Armenian law because of a common
Indo-European ethnic origin.36 A climax was reached in the political
bias of the 1930s. The perfection of Roman law was taken for
granted, and the distinction between Roman and German law nar-
rowed, so that the latter could benefit from the qualities of the for-
mer, and a new model of an anti-individualistic Roman law was built
in search of a closer adherence to the political inspiration of the Nazi
movement.37 In Ernst Shoenbauer's opinion, it was impossible to
compare the laws of peoples not ethnically related, such as Germans
and Egyptians.'
It is necessary to mention the strong challenge to the Aryan the-
ory that was brought by Paul Koshaker39 before the war and by Sla-
vomir Condanari-Michler4 ° after it. But the Aryan theory has been
supported also by cultural comparativists such as Georges Dum6zil 4"
Since the historical work represents an attempt to mediate
among the "historical field" and the audience,' 2 it is not at all sur-
prising that such a mediation was reached in the last century in Ger-
many around the following model:
1. Romans, Germans and other peoples are all linked by their
common Indo-European roots;
36. Garabed Amaduni, Influsso del diritto romano giustinianeo sul diritto armeno
e quantita di tal influsso [The impact of Roman law on Armenia], 1935 ACTA
CONGRESSUS IURIDICI INTERNATIONALIS 2.
37. Ernst Schoenbauer formulated these ideas in a lecture delivered at the
Deutscher Rechtshistorikertag in 1936. See M. SToLLEIs, GEMEINWOHLFORMELN IM
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN RECHT [COMMON TRENDS IN NAZI LAW] 35 (1973).
38. Ernst Schoenbauer, Zur Frage des Eigentumsueberganges beim Kauf [Trans-fer of Property by Sale], in ZEITSCHRIFr DER SAVIGNY-STIFrUNG FUR
RECHTGESCHICHTE 52 (1932).
39. Paul Koschaker, Was Vermag die Vergleichende Rechtwissenschaft zur Indo-
germanenfrage beizusteuern? [What Did We Get from Indo-Germanic Comparativ-
ism?], 1 FESTSCHRJFr HIRT 147 (1936) (according to whom legal history should pay
no particular attention to race).
40. S. Condanari-Michler, Ueber Schuld und Schaden in der Antike [Negligence
and Damage in Ancient Law], 3 ScRrrr FERRINI28 (Dott. A. Giuffr6 ed., 1948).
41. G. DUMEZIL, LA RELIGION ROMAIN ARCHAIQUE [EARLY ROMAN RELIGION]
585 (1966) (references marriage rites in Rome and in ancient India).
42. HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1973).
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2. Roman law was part of an Indo-European legal culture;
3. Roman law is the most perfect product of this culture;
4. Therefore, Roman law can be the basis upon which to build a
modem German system as the most perfect Western legal
system.
Rome is the projection of a myth. Historical consciousness and
genealogies associated with it have, in my opinion, a political dimen-
sion which cannot be underestimated: it gives people something
worth fighting for. It is indeed quite interesting, in contrast with
German professors engaged in the Aryan theory, to compare Jewish
scholars who note the presence of Semitic elements in early Rome.4
It seems to me that this "recall to Rome" is still a way to state who
we are and to refine a picture of ourselves. Of course, the picture
depends on the framework, and we are forced to acknowledge that
the Aryan framework has been shown to be quite successful.
C. The Western "European" Consciousness
The same mechanisms we traced in nineteenth-century German
culture are still at work in today's new European setting. Those
mechanisms are working to create a Western legal consciousness.
I am interested in the challenge to the Western legal tradition as
a whole, and not merely to particular elements or aspects of it. This
is manifested above all in the confrontation with non-Western civili-
zations and philosophies.' I think that this is a necessary effort be-
cause, in the last years, I assisted in various efforts to establish the
pillars of this challenge as the basis of comparative law.
As I said, I see these efforts as strategies to legitimize Western
supremacy in the field of law, through the pursuit of genealogies.
Genealogies help to define who we think we are or would like to
think we are. They define an "us" and a "them," and they are an es-
sential mechanism of how identities are constructed." The "tracing
back of common roots" is a work of representation, which occupies a
central place in current studies on culture, especially in the practice
43. See Reuven Yaron, Semitic Elements in Early Rome, in DAUBE NOSTER:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY FOR DAVID DAUBE 343 (Alan Watson cd., 1974).
44. See also HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMtATION OF
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 33 (1983).
45. On the role of historical legacies as respectability in defining social identities,
see BEVERLEY SKEGGS, FORMATIONS OF CLASS AND GENDER: BECOMING
RESPECTABLE (1997).
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of exhibiting cultures as "others."46
Thus the "Western root" of modern law becomes an issue. If it
could be shown that the genealogical tree of Western civilization has
roots in the soils of many different lands, a vision of it as a pluralistic,
diverse, multiethnic and multicultural society might be legitimized
However, the exclusion of non-Europeans from the foundation of
"Western" tradition has been, in my mind, quite successful because it
manufactures a picture of legal history that is received as plain com-
mon sense, shaping an almost universal cultural status quo.
I argue that this status quo is ungrounded, and that there are
possible countermoves, in particular the use of a delegitimizing cri-
tique as an attempt to operate a background/foreground shift. 8 This
kind of critique is necessary to perform a specific politically moti-
vated operation of reversing figure and ground, showing that there
are more ways to change the status quo than previously appeared.
The political motive here is to question the Western cultural domi-
nance in the field of law in favor of a multicultural view. I do not
think that it is a problem of new findings but a question of new in-
sights for a different understanding and for approaching the sources
from new angles.49 The result is to be a global rewriting of the narra-
tive standard. Visions of law-in-history are crucial to liberal and con-
servative legal scholarships," and critical insight must consequently
focus upon them.
I want to show how strong the idea that the foundation of the
Western legal mind lies on the extraordinary nature of its features, as
an original offspring of human spirit, and how this reputation is
linked to governance projects with practical implications.
My aim is to justify the impression that the historical conscious-
ness on which Western man has prided himself on since the beginning
of the nineteenth century may be little more than a theoretical basis
for the ideological position from which Western civilization views its
relationship, not only to cultures and civilizations preceding it, but
also to those contemporary with it. In short I think that it is possible,
46. See CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICEs (Stuart Hall
ed., 1997).
47. See Guy MacLean Rogers, Multiculturalism and the Foundations of Western
Civilization, in BLACK ATHENA REvISITED, supra note 25, at 428,429.
48. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SICLE 248
(1997).
49. See Yaron, supra note 43.
50. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984).
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particularly in the field of law, to view historical consciousness as a
specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of
modern, industrial society can be retroactively substantiated.5'
It is apparent to me that such broad cultural accounts, especially
when based on supposed Roman and Greek individualism, are in-
tended to mark a sharp distinction between the West and traditional
societies and to reaffirm a clear superiority of Western patterns.-
Due to this biased approach, the legal systems of the West are
presented as part of a common tradition or "family"" sharing pecu-
liar values, a similar approach to legal techniques and a net of com-
mon structures. This "family" is presented as the cornerstone of the
"rule of law" in the modern world, as they were in history. In this
way the modern discipline of comparative law and the old study of
Roman law converge in the tracing of common roots. As we have
seen, even the split between the common law and civil law traditions
in the Middle Ages did not break the unity of the Roman tradition
and its link with the outstanding achievements of Roman law." All
this entails, of course, a highly positive evaluation of the "unique-
ness" of Western law as the final outcome of a tradition, as an ongo-
ing uninterrupted process,' that lead us to where we are today.
Such a theory may be twined with the restatement of a project to
use a renewed version of Roman laws as the common paste by which
to build up a newer law for European countries.' Such a project
51. WHrrE, supra note 42, at 2.
52. See AARON GUREVICH, THE ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN INDIVIDUALISM 3 (1995).
53. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the
World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 5,23 (1997).
54. See W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COM'.M1ION
LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 21 (F.H. Lawson ed., 2d ed. 1965); see also Alan
Watson, Roman Law and English Law: Two Patterns of Legal Development (The
Fifth Annual Brendan Brown Lecture), 36 LoY. L. REv. 247 (1990).
55. David Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil Law Tradition,
70 Ci.-KENTL. REv. 1515 (1995).
56. David Johnston, The Renewal of the Old, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 80 (1997).
57. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBUGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIvILIAN TRADmON (1990). This work received a mass of
comments showing its importance in today legal culture. For book reviews, see Peter
B.H. Birks, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of tile Civilian Tradition,
13 J. LEG. HIST. 311 (1992); James Gordley, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foun-
dations of the Civilian Tradition, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 1002 (1992); Tony Honore, The
Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 107 L.Q. REv.
504 (1991); David Johnston. The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Ci-
vilian Tradition, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1113 (1995); Peter G. Stein, The Law of Obliga-
tions: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 38 AM. J. LEG. HIsT. 94 (1994);
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would have quite practical implications' in the unveiling of Europe
as a global alternative to the United States. So we face a theory sup-
porting a governance project encouraging a particular use of com-
parative law59 as a rising academic discipline6 toward which it is
highly recommended to assume a critical attitude. In fact, this proj-
ect assumes the typical function of comparative law which is to elabo-
rate the etiquette of reciprocal differences between an us and them, a
center and periphery, a west and an east." What is peculiar is that
this theory entails a devaluation of the classical common/civil law dis-
tinction and favors a convergence theory among "modern" systems.
This convergence theory depicts a more unitary Western legal family
cemented on Roman pillars, in contrast with other legal cultures of
the world.
I would stress the fact that the packing of the Western legal fam-
ily is a peculiar enterprise of the discipline of comparative law, and
the main method followed to divide the world into legal family or cul-
tural circles62 is still that of genealogies.6 The elements of the field
are organized into a story through an arrangement of narrative motifs
according to a standard theory of the historical work.6 The Roman
roots are the inaugural motifs; the various events of the Middle Ages
and the rising of the modern State characterize the transitional mo-
tifs; and the actual Western systems constitute the terminating motifs.
As any effort in construction would do, this convergence entails ex-
clusion. It is common in comparative efforts to contrast the different
systems of law, presenting the inner development of each family,"
Tony Weir, The Laws of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition,
50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 165 (1991); Simon Whittaker, The Law of Obligations: Roman
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 1994 LLOYDs MAR. & COM. L. 298.
58. Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in
TowARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 65 (A.S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 1994). It was a
rising project which few expressed dissenting opinions. See Pierre Legrand, Against
a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
59. Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman and Comparative Law: The European Per-
spective, 16 J. LEG. HIST. 21 (1995) (some remarks apropos a recent controversy).
60. See Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1), supra note 2; Ewald, Comparative
Jurisprudence (II), supra note 2.
61. See Kennedy, supra note 1.
62. See the approach followed in 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 2nd ed. 1987).
63. See Mattei, supra note 53, at 40 (criticizing the conventional approach).
64. See WHITE, supra note 42, at 5.
65. See RENiA DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCrION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (3d ed.
1985).
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something that indeed seems to be not at all comparative in nature.
Thus, from my viewpoint, the projects to draw a "map" of legal
systems and to build a common core of European and Western law
are really biased, non-neutral political projects of governance sup-
ported by the use of the academic discipline of comparative law.
Consequently, in the following sections, I shall try to outline how
Watson's theory of legal transplants and Sacco's theory of formants
can be used against the establishment to produce a different critical
approach to comparative law.
HI. Comparative Law as Critique
A. Spread and Dissemination
I come now to the second half of the argument addressing the is-
sue of import/export of legal models. In this second section, I outline
a legal model that takes into account the borrowings and transplants
that take place in any system of governance. This model takes the
considerations enumerated in the previous section into account and
uses Watson's theory of legal transplants" as a basis. I radically in-
terpret this theory of legal transplants, instead of conservatively, to
display how this form of conservativism can be used for delegitima-
tion and critique. While Watson's theory is normally challenged as
conservative or worse,' it can be a powerful tool for a critical theory
of comparative law.
This is the case because the delegimative role it can play and its
eventual revolutionary impact are not properly understood. I do not
espouse all of Watson's assertions, and I dissent on many points.
Like all theories, even Watson's theory is a package, and we can de-
construct it, using some things while rejecting others, but I also think
that we retain the bulk of this theory if we adopt the following read-
ing of it.
If we adopt the postulate of a close inherent relationship be-
tween law and the society in which it operates, legal transplants
would be virtually impossible. Instead, the history and development
of the law are characterized by a prodigious amount of borrowings.
Legal systems are normally amalgams of patterns received from
other systems. Borrowing is common throughout social life, and thus
66. See sources cited infra notes 69-71.
67. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 2.
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the prevalence of borrowed elements in law is hardly explicable en-
tirely in terms peculiar to law.
Legal borrowing calls for special explanation only insofar as it
differs from other kinds of cultural diffusion. What is wanted in the
study of the diffusion of legal ideas is not simply a catalog of bor-
rowed "traits" but an examination of the devices for cultural sharing
and selection through which legal "unity" is constructed and sus-
tained." From this standpoint the essence of a culture is contained in
its contradictions, the picking up of foreign elements and the ideo-
logical presentation of them as composing a unity. Ultimately, com-
parative law should aim to produce a general theory about law and
legal change and the relationship between legal systems and rules and
the society in which they operate." The history of a system of law is
largely a history of borrowings of legal models from other legal sys-
tems. I think that this is a perfect statement of a critical view of the
law and of legal tradition.
The conservative flavor normally perceived in Watson's ap-
proach is due to what I call Watson's "serendipity approach" to legal
change. Chance, he argues, plays a major role in determining what
law is borrowed." Watson points out that legal transplants are not
usually the result of a systematic search for the most suitable model.
Social and economic factors have a much more limited and attenu-
ated effect than normally supposed in theories of law and society, and
law is largely autonomous and operates in its own sphere. He em-
phasizes the absurdity and casual happening of many transplants and
mocks every effort to build a theory, producing a mass of possible
counter-examples to quiet every possible theory.
I think that conventional criticisms of the law's autonomy singled
out by Watson are misconceived and politically naive. Watson's
premise is that the law is largely autonomous because it is the prod-
uct of a lawmaking elite, constantly in search of a legitimation and
relatively insulated from social concerns. From this point of view, his
theory of legal autonomy can be used as a strong critique of the ex-
isting and unlegitimated governing elite of lawyers,71 especially in
68. See also Edward Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 AM. J. COMP. L.
1 (Supp. 1990).
69. See Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
316 (1978).
70. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1993); See also Ajani, supra note 5.
71. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 119 (1985).
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Western countries.'
The theory orders a picture of law as a bundle of borrowings
pursued by insulated elites, who constantly deny the fact that any-
thing is borrowed. These elites present highly sophisticated theories
of interpretation and scholarly elaborated genealogies of evolution,
which are intended as strategies of self-legitimation. This reading of
the theory produces a picture of the law as a battleground of "elites"
competing to provide legal doctrines, rules and strategies of societal
governance.' Since the use of "discourse" as a technical and elabo-
rated pattern of framing the world is a peculiarly relevant strategy of
self-legitimation and dominance, I think that the study of how dis-
courses evolves and becomes borrowed/transplanted is crucial to a
radical comparative legal analysis. It is on this basis that I further my
argument in the next section.
B. Formants and Elites
In this section we can try to use the previously developed read-
ing of Watson's theory in connection with the "formants" approach
suggested by Sacco." The theory of legal formants focuses on law as
a social activity: a formant of the law is a group, type of personnel or
community institutionally involved in the activity of creating law.
From this point of view, we find an established legal profession in the
Western legal tradition and three main types of personnel within it:
the practicing lawyer, the legal policymaker (legislator, appellate
court judge or upper-level administrator) and the legal scholar (law
professors and the like). Judges, legislators and legal theorists are all
interacting and competing formants.
These professionals produce different kinds of texts: statutes,
opinions, holdings, articles, treatises, briefs, summons, broad princi-
ples, narrow rules and so on. They have an archive (previous writers,
precedents, etc.) and a professional, tested style to transform old
72. See KENNEDY, supra note 48, at 284 (emphasizing the role of elites as a dis-
tinctive feature of progressive historicism in comparison with neo-Marxian analysis).
73. For a use of Watson's theory pointing at "borrowings" as "techniques" of le-
gal elites in collaboration with political leaders with reference to Islamic law, see
Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Lmv: Islamic Law Reform and
the Theory of Legal Change (pt. 1), 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (1994); Donald Horowitz,
The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal
Change (pt. 2), 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 543,570 (1994).
74. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(pt. 1), 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1991); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law (pt. 2), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991).
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documents and produce new ones. These texts and documents, and
the way they are produced, interlocked and reused by others, become
a key feature in the understanding of the working of the law. To
cope with these documents, the formants approach adopts a new kind
of form criticism, in the widest sense, as a method to uncover, sepa-
rate and explain the various materials used to produce the texts. This
approach looks for differences of all kinds between and within the
documents. From this standpoint, what we call the meaning of a legal
text is just the link, established by professionals, between a text and
another document: a plea, scholarly article or decision.
The law can then be deconstructed as a set of interlocking
documents used by professionals according to their personal or insti-
tutional strategies. The legal tradition is seen as the result of an ac-
tual strategy that considers a variety of independent documents and
texts competing for hegemony as interlocked in a pattern of continu-
ity. The formant approach is then a totally comparative approach
based on a kind of "external" study of the law as a form of sociologi-
cal and economic appraisal of lawyers' activities, coupled with an "in-
ternal" analysis of documents as a kind of form criticism. This ap-
proach has two major implications. First, the legal process is seen as
a competitive arena in which different types of elite groups fight for
control. Second, there is a total refusal of the metaphysics of the
unity of law and the "meaning" of legal propositions.
The main idea is to substitute the model of the law as a more or
less consistent system of interrelated, hierarchically-connected
propositions with a model of competing formants within the unique
setting and constraints of one legal tradition." The major conse-
quence of the theory, in the field of legal interpretation and legal
hermeneutics, is that a precedent, statute and the like, have only the
meaning attached to it by competing elitarian groups. That meaning
is placed under different institutional constraints and with different
incentive structures.
From this point of view the theory draws a distinction between
the working rules, the practices of a legal system and the symbolic
set, the discourse used by lawyers to describe, justify, rationalize the
rules and give meaning to texts and authorities. The distinction is in-
deed one pointing at the "ideology" of a legal tradition -to be under-
stood as the system of representations located in the everyday prac-
75. See also Mattei, supra note 53, at 101.
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tices76 and in the antagonism between "formants" in the production
of meaning.
The theory implies that it is always necessary to deconstruct the
law to reach its working level beyond the peculiar legal discourse of
any one tradition. This deconstruction is necessary not only for the
sake of comparison but also for making meaningful economic analy-
sis of the law. Deconstructive criticism is neither a luxury nor a
philosophical intruder, but a necessity coming from within. From this
standpoint, the theory of formants is a global internal critique of legal
discourse. It is beyond the theory's task to raise external critiques,
but it certainly entails an anti-formalistic appraisal. In the field of le-
gal hermeneutics, it disfavors the metaphysics of meaning.
Finally, the formants approach clashes with positivism as a pat-
tern of jurisprudence. At least in the Kelsen approach, the law is de-
picted as a pyramid of State norms consistently improved by State of-
ficials. The sketch we now derive by the formant approach is that of
several sources of the law, and the "State" looks more like a perma-
nently unstable compromise among competing legal sources. The
Harvard Legal Process School shares similar views but with a strong
bias toward equilibrium and a strong commitment to classic liberal
values. In the new formant approach, the effort is merely deconstruc-
tivist. Values and commitments are not metaphysically embodied in
the process, but they are seen more as complex strategies of opposing
legal actors. Thus, in terms of jurisprudence, the formant approach is
similar to some radical form of American realism with two main dif-
ferences. First, the formant approach is grounded on comparison as
the tool of understanding law. Second, in the formant approach the
essentials of law are not reduced to working rules, and the role of ju-
dicial narratives and discourses are as important as the practices done
for the purpose of social communication and social stability. Judges
are but one of the factors, more apparent but often less important
than others.
For the formants approach, the "difference" or "similarity" be-
tween two legal cultures is peculiarly shaped by the legal elites and
their styles in discoursive practice. Thus, the problem is how and why
styles are selected, maintained and transmitted. I will make some
suggestions in the next section.
76. See TERRY EAGELTON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (1991).
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C. Transplants and Strategies
From the previous sections we can maintain that law, at least
within the Western legal family, evolved normally by transplants, and
that the "logic" of them is directed by competing elites in search of
legitimation. I concentrate on the dual aspect of "giving reasons" for
a rule and "providing a legitimation" for the jurist. If we perceive the
"dual nature" of the process, then we can see how the selection of
opinions and discourses depend on a strategy of legitimation, and
vice versa: that an elite can legitimate itself for giving opinions. From
this standpoint there can be a basic strategy for all the groups com-
peting within the legal process, namely "covering cases."
I intend to find solutions and opinions to handle still uncovered
cases, filling the gaps and working out rules to cope wilh hard cases.
If the "inner" sources and authorities do not cover a class of cases,
the basic strategy suggests finding authorities "outside" and borrow-
ing solutions from them. This strategy minimizes the possible resis-
tance because it borrows opinions, doctrines and rules from known
languages, rather than from unknown blends. Borrowing from
proximate systems, rather than from distant ones, and especially bor-
rowing from prestigious patterns, rather than from discredited pat-
terns or models, is one aspect of the strategy of covering cases to
avoid resistance. It is simply much easier to support a solution in-
voking a prestigious authority.
Therefore, the model I have described can be labeled as a strate-
gic decentralized approach to diffusionism. It depends on the strate-
gies of the borrowing systems; they pick up what they need, and they
use what they borrowed to cope with their own problems. A
"model" is highly prestigious if it is borrowed by many, but this de-
pends less on the quality of the model than on the circumstances in
which it meets the diverse expectations of the borrowers. Of course
the "elites" of the donor system can try to design their own strategy
of dominance, but as far as the process of borrowing is controlled by
the elites of the receiving system, the elite's strategy can succeed only
if it meets that of the receiving system. The best strategy for trans-
planting-elites is "ideology and propaganda" to induce the borrow-
ing-elites to believe that the offered model meets their expectations.
Thus, the basic strategy in transplanting is to use a prestigious presen-
tation of the model, as one that can easily cover important cases in a
way appreciated in the receiving country. Sometimes a reference to
"efficiency" is a magic keyword in the rhetoric of borrowing-elites.
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The model I propose is thus a model of "basic" strategies: "cov-
ering cases" and "prestigious propaganda."" Of course, chance plays
a major role in any strategic game, and this explains many "serendip-
ity" examples. However, chance can become just a particular case
covered by theory. In my view, "prestige" is a label that defines
complex interrelations among cultures, but certainly prestige is de-
termined by the followers, according to their strategies, which may
well be totally antagonistic toward the donor systems.
What remains after this inquiry is a new outline of the task of
comparative law as an insight into the "ceaseless discursive warfare"
which is fought within legal cultures among competing groups of
elites. This new outline is the ground upon which I reach some con-
clusion in the final section of my work.
IV. Conclusion: "Ideological Comparativism"
The discourse in the previous sections describes my two basic
points: an attack of "unicity" 7 and a clash with the metaphysics of
meaning. Both these points have an impact over theories of adjudi-
cation.
From this standpoint a major task of comparative law can be to
see how institutions are packed together with a consciousness to le-
gitimate the governance of professional elites in a number of legal
systems. The activity of lawyers is basically an "ideological" activity:
their job is to produce meaning to make institutions work. Compara-
tivism, however, is a move away from this ideological mechanism.
What a comparative lawyer can do, as a comparativist, is to reveal the
unofficial and critique those processes of meaning production as so-
cial and political realities, particularly in a world of "contamina-
tions." A comparative scholar should explain the details of con-
sciousness, dismantling the various mechanisms of meaning
production and casting irony over interpretive practices. As such
comparative law can be a powerful tool for the critique of adjudica-
tion.
Is this a viable future? Once somebody told me that future is
77. It is not hard to see how much the French have been masters in this game at
all comparative law conferences. See also Ajani, supra note 5.
78. FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPrrALISM (1991).
79. See also P.G. Monateri, Ragles et technique de la definition en France et en
Allemagne: La Synecdoque francais [Rules and Definitions in France and Germany:
The French Synecologies], 1984 REv. INT. DR. COMP. 3,45.
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something we are always vaguely planning and never actually doing.
Of course, we can simply make plans, and the future will take care of
itself.
